“Oh, Dignity too?” Said the Robot: Human Dignity as the Basis for the Governance of Robotics by Zardiashvili, L. & Fosch-Villaronga, E.
Vol.:(0123456789)
Minds and Machines
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-019-09514-6
1 
“Oh, Dignity too?” Said the Robot: Human Dignity 
as the Basis for the Governance of Robotics
Lexo Zardiashvili1  · Eduard Fosch‑Villaronga1
Received: 14 October 2019 / Accepted: 21 December 2019 
© The Author(s) 2020
Abstract
Healthcare robots enable practices that seemed far-fetched in the past. Robots might 
be the solution to bridge the loneliness that the elderly often experience; they may 
help wheelchair users walk again, or may help navigate the blind. European Insti-
tutions, however, acknowledge that human contact is an essential aspect of per-
sonal care and that the insertion of robots could dehumanize caring practices. Such 
instances of human–robot interactions raise the question to what extent the use and 
development of robots for healthcare applications can challenge the dignity of users. 
In this article, therefore, we explore how different robot applications in the health-
care domain support individuals in achieving ‘dignity’ or pressure it. We argue that 
since healthcare robot applications are novel, their associated risks and impacts may 
be unprecedented and unknown, thus triggering the need for a conceptual instru-
ment that is binding and remains flexible at the same time. In this respect, as safety 
rules and data protection are often criticized to lack flexibility, and technology eth-
ics to lack enforceability, we suggest human dignity as the overarching governance 
instrument for robotics, which is the inviolable value upon which all fundamental 
rights are grounded.
Keywords Human dignity · Governance · Robotics · Human–robot interaction · 
Healthcare robots
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Progress benefits mankind. Technology does not necessarily do that.
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1 Introduction
Progress in science and technology makes our lives more comfortable and 
extended. Prolonging our lives increases our chances to live more experiences 
and to contribute in more ways to our society, but it also makes us largely depend-
ent on healthcare (WHO 2018). Due to the demographic regression in developed 
countries and the number of persons who may potentially take care of older adults 
and contribute to the health and social systems is dramatically shrinking. Accord-
ing to the World Health Organization, the proportion of the world’s population 
over 60 years will nearly double from 12 to 22% between 2015 and 2050 (WHO 
2018). At the same time, statistics show that significant neurological disorders 
such as autism spectrum disorder (ASD), and debilitating conditions such as obe-
sity, or Parkinson’s are on the rise (Tapus et al. 2019).
The integration of robots in healthcare provides a practical, complementary 
solution to address the demand raised by the shortage of healthcare profession-
als and promises safer, more efficient, and personalized care. For instance, robots 
might be presented as the solution to bridge the loneliness that elderly or disabled 
persons often experience. On the other hand, European Institutions acknowledge 
that human contact is an essential aspect of personal care and that the insertion 
of robots could dehumanize caring practices (European Commission 2018). Such 
instances of human–robot interactions raise the question to what extent the use 
and development of robots for healthcare applications can challenge the dignity 
of users (Vallor 2011; Sharkey 2014; Fosch-Villaronga 2019). Recent literature 
also highlights that technology might have unintended long-term harmful impacts 
on the human psyche, in particular on the way the brain works (Carr 2010) and 
the person’s identity and self-respect, and this also questions whether these tech-
nologies are adequate for care purposes.
In this article, we solely focus on robotics, and look at different robot applica-
tions in the healthcare domain, with the particular lens of human dignity. Human 
dignity, a term often used in health (care) debate, also constitutes a legal concept 
that, to some extent, can be understood as the crucial minimum requirement for 
ensuring the protection of every individuals’ self-respect in society. Healthcare 
applications of robots might support individuals in achieving ‘dignity’ and at the 
same time, pressure it. The objective of this paper is not to thoroughly analyze 
all the applications and conclude which applications violate ‘human dignity,’ 
but, instead, provide an overview of how these applications promote or pressure 
dignity.
In Sect. 2, we provide a brief historical overview of dignity. We elaborate on 
the core content of this legal concept and describe its various ethical concep-
tions. We discuss two (opposite) ways the use of robotics in healthcare can affect 
human dignity. While Sect. 3 lists various uses of robot-technology in healthcare 
that might promote human dignity, Sect. 4 analyzes the negative impacts such use 
might have on this concept. This latter section addresses how the use of robots in 
healthcare might lead to the objectification of individuals, how it may dehuman-
ize healthcare practices, and may, in the long run, cause other long-term adverse 
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effects, such as dependency. In Sect. 5, we evaluate the suitability of the current 
regulatory approaches concerning care robots. In the end, we close the article 
identifying dignity as an overarching legal concept from which legal frameworks 
should confine the regulation of the use and development of robots in healthcare.
2  Human Dignity
2.1  Brief History of Dignity
Human dignity is the inviolable value upon which all fundamental rights are grounded. 
Human dignity represents an existing legal concept, which has played an essential 
role in the adoption of constitutional documents globally as well as the development 
of human rights adjudication. The significance of human dignity as a legal concept 
became apparent during the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR), and since then it has been one of the central concepts in the drafting of other 
human rights instruments (Dicke 2002) that have used the concept to prohibit, for 
instance:
A. Slavery (Assembly 1948);
B. Torture (Assembly 1948);
C. Inhuman or degrading treatment (Assembly 1948);
D. Forced labor (European Convention on Human Rights 1950);
E. Death penalty (ICCPR Second Optional Protocol 1989);
F. Extreme poverty (Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action 1993);
Some authors understand human dignity as the central value underpinning the 
entirety of international human rights law. While the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR) (Council of Europe 2018) or the treaties of the European Union do 
not expressly mention it, the concept of human dignity has reared its head in the case-
law of the European Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Justice. It has 
been stated to be ‘the very essence’ of the ECHR and to constitute the value under-
lying European Union equality legislation (O’Mahony 2012). ECtHR now regards 
human dignity as underpinning all of the rights protected by the Convention (McCrud-
den 2008). Despite the large and erudite body of literature, there is little or no con-
sensus as to what the concept of human dignity demands of lawmakers and adjudica-
tors (O’Mahony 2012). ‘Indeed, for all the importance and emphasis placed on human 
dignity in the text of international conventions, domestic constitutions, and court deci-
sions, the elusive nature of the concept has led many commentators to argue that it is at 
best, meaningless or unhelpful, and at worst potentially damaging to the protection of 
fundamental rights (O’Mahony 2012).’
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2.2  Minimum Core of Dignity
In their book, “Dignity in twenty-first Century”, Schroeder and Bani-Sadr (2017) 
state that ‘it is difficult to write about dignity’ and provides a summary of West-
ern academic debates about the meaning of dignity, elaborating that ‘…[human 
dignity] has been described as powerful, yet useless and vague; arbitrary, yet 
addictive; elusive, yet widely used; groundless, yet revolutionary; of supreme 
importance, yet without a reference point.’ Other scholars share their conclu-
sion that dignity is too multifaceted as a concept to be captured in one essence. 
McCrudden (2008), whose article on ‘Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation 
of Human Rights’ stands out as a reference point for legal scholars, argues that 
human dignity does not provide a universalistic, principled basis for judicial deci-
sion-making in the human rights context.
As McCrudden (2008) explains, drafters of the UDHR (that represent the 
first universal human rights instruments) were facing a problem that no theoreti-
cal basis, from the plethora of theories, could provide the justification for human 
rights (speculations on man’s divine origin, immortal destiny) to satisfy the need 
to have sufficient consensus in order to move forward (McCrudden 2008). Jacque 
Maritain proposed a strategy to concentrate on agreeing first about what prac-
tices were necessary to be prohibited (see, for example, “list A–F” above) and 
then provided its justification with human dignity (Glendon 2001). While drafters 
first agreed that, for example, torture, should be prohibited, justification of such 
consensus with a flexible notion of human dignity enabled a ‘concrete political 
agreement on a seemingly shared ground (Shultziner 2007). ‘Seemingly,’ because 
the different parties that took part in a constitutive act could conceive human dig-
nity as representing their particular set of values and worldview.
This excursion in drafting history should not be understood as explaining that 
human dignity has no content. On the contrary, such content is the reason why 
Maritain’s strategy worked in the first place. While the application of dignity is 
widely divergent and has the perplexing capacity to pull in several directions, 
McCrudden acknowledges the feasibility to distill a minimum content of human 
dignity that has been applied universally and borrows three elements from Neu-
man (2000) to outline what he calls the ‘minimum core’ of human dignity. These 
elements are:
1. Every human being possesses an intrinsic worth, merely by being human;
2. Intrinsic worth should be recognized and respected by others, and some forms of 
treatment are inconsistent with respect for this intrinsic worth;
3. The state exists for individual human beings (not vice versa).
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2.3  Conceptions of Dignity
In other words, human dignity is a linguistic-symbol that resembles a belief in the 
intrinsic worth of humans that they derive by merely being human (Schroeder and 
Bani-Sadr 2017). Such belief, therefore, has been established as the explicit univer-
sal legal principle, that among other things, transcends any particular conflicts with 
ideologies. Only in Western philosophy, there are myriad conceptions1 of human 
dignity grounding it in humanity’s divine creation, or rational autonomy, social rec-
ognition of each other’s value, or unique ability to exercise control over the environ-
ment (Schroeder and Bani-Sadr 2017). Some may argue that human dignity is even 
‘anthropo-eccentric,’ seeing humans ‘strange’ and ‘incomplete,’ rather than ‘supe-
rior’ species (Floridi 2016). Nevertheless, whatever is the standpoint of a viewer, the 
concept of human dignity transcends conflicts and makes a belief in human excep-
tionalism universal to human rights and law in general (McCrudden 2008).
Human dignity is timeless—an everlasting value that defines human nature and 
adaptable—ever-evolving with the ideas of what constitutes being human (Weisstub 
2002). Human dignity can be seen as a universal concept that sums up the human’s 
relation to himself, to others, its environment, and the universe. The way humans 
interact with robots can to some extent influence how human beings see them-
selves, influencing a shift of the sense of autonomy (privacy, self-determination), as 
well as self-respect (sense of self-worth), which triggers the need for the discourse 
on the concept of ‘human dignity’ and how the relationship between humans and 
robot technology pressures it. Recent technological advances meant to interact with 
humans may require us to rethink what human dignity involves, and use strategic 
adaptability of the concept to regulate the use of robots in healthcare, possibly by 
further regulatory intervention.
2.4  Healthcare Robots from the Lens of Human Dignity
The insertion of healthcare robotics raise the question of whether such technologies 
are beneficial for the users, or they are a mere reflection of a foolish road to more 
cost-effective care. Sharkey (2014) published an article on ‘considerations of the 
robot care on the dignity of older people’ through the lens of Capability Approach 
referring to the work of Nussbaum (2009) and discussing the ‘unsolved’ question of 
disability in the context of human dignity. Nussbaum (2009) argues that the goal of 
social justice should be to ensure that all humans achieve a threshold level of all of 
the capabilities. What this approach entails, is that although dignity (equal worth) 
is inherent for each individual, some do not have capabilities (mental or physical) 
to maintain it independently. For instance, a person with severe mental impairment 
(e.g., older people with dementia or Alzheimer’s) might not be able to satisfy their 
basic needs. In these cases, protecting human dignity must be a positive obligation 
1 Concept vs. conception: concept—what exists; conception—why it exists (what exists) (see McCrud-
den 2008).
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for the state, to ensure that these people in question get the help they need to achieve 
the minimum level of self-respect and self-worth, guaranteed by human dignity.
Building on Sharkey’s (2014) findings, we are extending the discussion to other 
care applications of robot technologies. Assistive robotics can take many forms. For 
example, they can be used as a platform for upper-limb rehabilitation (Pulido et al. 
2019), as a tool to encourage infant leg-motion training (Fitter et  al. 2019), or to 
teach students with intellectual disabilities (Reardon et al. 2019). While such appli-
cations can be helpful in a myriad of positive ways, they may cause to elevate feel-
ings of loneliness, impair autonomy, and adjust a person’s sense of self, that may 
challenge the concept of human dignity and result in its violation.
3  Robots Promoting Dignity
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (United 
Nations 2007) was born ‘to promote, protect and ensure the full and equal enjoy-
ment of all human rights and fundamental freedoms by all persons with disabilities, 
and to promote respect for their inherent dignity.’ Although existing such a Conven-
tion, it is often unclear how those general principles translate into concrete actions.
In this section, we explore how various applications of robot technology may 
have the potential to realize the principles enshrined in the Convention’s Art. 3, 
which focus on the respect for inherent dignity, individual autonomy including the 
freedom to make one’s own choices, and independence of persons with disabilities; 
non-discrimination; full and effective participation and inclusion in society; and 
accessibility, among others.
For this purpose, we concentrate on the following list of applications of robots:
A. Feeding robots;
B. Robots for blind;
C. Exoskeletons;
D. Sex robots;
E. Therapeutic robots;
3.1  Feeding Robots
Having a meal together with family and friends is often taken for granted by many, 
but has a high impact on the morale of those with disabilities, including those who 
have problems with their upper-limbs, stroke patients, Parkinson’s, or dementia 
(Canal et  al. 2016; Herlant 2018). People with disabilities sometimes need assis-
tance in feeding. Assisted feeding is the process of feeding a person who cannot 
otherwise feed themselves. Human assisted feeding is very time-consuming, and lit-
tle attention is often given to it (Tsang 2008). Moreover, the feeding process turns 
into a caregiver-patient interaction, which now needs to coordinate in procedure and 
execution (Athlin et al. 1990) something that normally prevents patients from enjoy-
ing their meal (Martinsen et al. 2008).
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In this respect, some engineers support the idea that ‘using a robotic feeding 
device would allow for increased privacy and intimacy during mealtime’ (Herlant 
2018). The incorporation of robotic arms in tables, or in robotic wheelchairs with a 
feeding function could give patients back their dignity (Leroux and Labruto 2012). 
Robotic feeding devices may help people with disabilities live more independently 
and participating in social life without the need of having a human carer. In such a 
case, it seems that the robot would promote dignity in caring practices, as it would 
allow a patient to eat alone or accompanied, as any other person would do.
3.2  Guiding Robots for the Blind
Some researchers envisioned in the late 1970s the development and use of service 
robots for supporting human navigation for the impaired (Fig. 1).
The MELDOG Project developed the ‘Guide Dog Robot,’ a robot that could 
assist a blind master in navigation, and set a precedent for future research (Tachi 
and Komoriya 1984). During the following years, the literature was rich in advances 
pointing to a similar direction (Lacey and Dawson-Howe 1998), although the tech-
nology has yet to be mainstream.
Guiding robots for the blind could improve users’ confidence, autonomy, and 
independence, thus increasing their sense of self-respect and promote their dig-
nity. Having a robot could also be the right solution for those who cannot afford 
to have an assistance-trained dog or those that do not want to have the responsi-
bility of taking care of a dog. Guiding robots could be mass-produced, affordable, 
Fig. 1  Guide Dog Robot, MELDOG Project from the TachiLab (see Guide Dog Robot (MELDOG) from 
TachiLab, https ://tachi lab.org/proje cts/meldo g.html)
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low-maintenance, and could incorporate communication capabilities beyond mere 
navigation.
Guiding robots could replace assistance dogs, those dogs specially trained 
to assist persons with disabilities such as the visually impaired, or persons with 
neurological disorders, and those who need psychiatric assistance (Howel et  al. 
2017). However, while available studies focus on the benefits dogs may have on 
humans, there is not much research on assistive dogs’ welfare (Bremhorst et al. 
2018). On the contrary, the available evidence suggests that using punishment in 
pet dog training is associated with undesirable behaviors and potentially adverse 
welfare outcomes. For now, it is unclear how assistance dog trainers use pun-
ishment or whether such punishments have long-term adverse effects on them 
(Bremhorst et al. 2018).
Although the scope of this paper is the concept of human dignity, it is worth 
mentioning that having robots instead of dogs assisting the blind could indirectly 
help realize the rights dogs have as sentient beings. More research is needed to 
understand animal welfare, as in the EU context mostly relates to food safety 
(Broom 2017).
Fig. 2  Lightweight exoskeleton from TWIICE (see http://twiic e.ch/, last accessed October 9, 2019)
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3.3  Regaining the Ability to Walk
An exoskeleton is a wearable robot attached to the wearer’s limbs to replace or 
enhance their movements. The majority of these exoskeletons are fastened directly 
to the user’s body and work together ‘in seamless integration with the user’s resid-
ual musculoskeletal system and sensory-motor control loops’ to assist him/her with 
minimal cognitive disruption and required compensatory motion’ (Tucker et  al. 
2017) (Fig. 2).
Exoskeletons are good helpers for the elderly unable to sit, stand, or who need 
personal assistance at home, but they cannot afford human caregivers. Mainly, they 
are robotic devices that help users to help users stand up and walk again, which 
is a primary human function. Walking stabilizes blood pressure, improves pulmo-
nary ventilation, prevents the degeneration of muscle and bone tissue, and increases 
joint mobility. Although there are wheelchairs that elevate the user up to the level of 
eye-contact, exoskeletons provide freedom to users and the possibility to do some 
exercise and increase muscle activity, which improves cognition abilities and oxygen 
flow to the brain. Exoskeletons can also be useful for rehabilitation. Human caregiv-
ers can help in the rehabilitation process of a person suffering from a spinal cord 
injury. However, human-based rehabilitation requires typically from three to five 
people actively involved. The use of exoskeleton technology can streamline such 
processes.
3.4  Sex Care Robots
Although every human should be able to enjoy physical touch, intimacy, and sexual 
pleasure, however, disabled people are often not in the position to fully experience 
the joys of life in the same manner as abled people. Similarly, older adults may have 
sexual needs that public healthcare tends to ignore as an essential part of their well-
being (Lusti-Narasimhan and Beard 2013). In 1993, the United Nations stated that 
persons with disabilities should enjoy family life and personal integrity, and should 
not be denied the opportunity to experience their sexuality, have sexual relationships 
and experience parenthood’ (UN 1993a, b, Rule 9, para. 2).
However, after more than 20 years of discussion, the universal access to sexual 
and reproductive health remains an unfinished agenda (Temmerman et al. 2014), as 
if society failed in recognizing people with disabilities as sexual beings (Maxwell 
et al. 2006). In this respect, there are authors that have begun to explore the potential 
use of sex robots for disabled care (Di Nucci 2017; Fosch-Villaronga and Poulsen 
2019). The literature lacks a comprehensive understanding of the impacts of sex 
robots for care purposes and needs further exploration.
3.5  Robot Therapists
‘In the good old days of Artificial Intelligence… we were writing the sentences on 
the blackboard and challenged one another to write a program that could “under-
stand” them.’ Colby (1981) remembered the early 1970s when he was working to 
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develop a machine that could act as a therapist for paranoid patients. More than four 
decades have passed, and artificially intelligent robots (and/or virtual agents) are 
able not just to scrape the sentences from the blackboard, but also to ‘isolate, cap-
ture, and render the most subtle and intimate behaviors, from an inadvertent blink 
to a jaw that slackens in surprise for a fraction of a second’ (Zuboff 2019). These 
‘robot therapists’ can take on high-level therapeutic interventions that used to be 
offered exclusively by highly trained, skilled health professionals. Researchers from 
the University of Munich found that the benefits of such agents might include ‘new 
modes of treatment, opportunities to engage hard-to-reach populations, better patient 
response, and freeing up time for physicians’ (Fiske et al. 2019).
4  Can robots Violate Human Dignity?
Societal acknowledgment of human being’s ‘worth’ is at the core of the concept of 
human dignity. However, certain practices might disregard this ‘worth’ or ‘value’ 
of human beings and, therefore, there might be a need for protection against such 
practices. Moreover, not foreseeing or anticipating potential adverse consequences 
might also affect human dignity. In the following subsections, we attempt to identify 
what robots, which practices, and what consequences risk disregarding this ‘value’ 
of being human.
4.1  Risk of Objectification by Challenging the Patient Autonomy
Human dignity as a ‘value’ entails that human beings cannot be treated like objects 
(Dworkin 2011). As Nussbaum (2009) suggests, objectification entails treating the 
person as lacking in autonomy or self-determination. One of the most challenging 
aspects of using robots in mental health practices is how to enable and respect the 
autonomy of a patient (Childress and Beauchamp 2001). Autonomy can be chal-
lenged, for instance, when a person with intellectual disabilities cannot understand 
what a robot is or what it does, therefore, cannot give fully informed consent, risking 
not only privacy infringement and manipulation, but even coercion (Vandemeuleb-
roucke et al. 2018). The lines where help and monitoring can become manipulation 
and coercion are often blurred in theory and practice (Fiske et  al. 2019). Hence, 
using robots as therapists (discussed in Sect. 3.5), as an assistant for the blind (dis-
cussed in Sect. 3.2), or sex robots (discussed in Sect. 3.4) challenges patient auton-
omy and risks their objectification. The extent to which ‘suspension of disbelief’ 
induced by the anthropomorphization of a robot caregiver leads to deception, and 
consequently violates human dignity, needs further investigation.
4.2  Risk of Dehumanized Practice
Weizenbaum (1976) highlighted that it was unethical using machines to listen, to 
understand, and to change, human emotions. Nowadays, research continues to 
suggest the importance of the human element in care and therapeutic practices 
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(European Parliament 2017; Fiske et  al. 2019). In general, therapeutic relation-
ships are prone to the risk of transference of emotions, thoughts, and feelings from a 
patient to a therapist. Similarly, such transference might occur towards robots. As it 
is unknown whether robot therapists will ever be able to deal adequately with such 
transference, pressure on ‘human dignity’ remains in question (White and Parotto 
2019).
The European Parliament (2017) recently warned about the possibility to dehu-
manize caring practices if human contact in sensitive contexts such as care is to be 
replaced by robot technologies. However, from care to sex robots, several compa-
nies claim that robots combat loneliness. Robots can be the interface that connects 
older adults that might live alone and might have relatively little human contact with 
the real world. The assumption that humans might be the best option to assist users 
and that the insertion of care robots might dehumanize caring practices is recurrent 
(European Parliament 2017). Dehumanization, while providing health care, suggests 
treating patients as if they lack mental capacities that we enjoy as human beings. 
As Herbert Kelman argues, being human has two features: ‘identity’—or a percep-
tion of the person ‘as an individual, independent and distinguishable from others, 
capable of making choices’ and ‘community’—a perception of the person as ‘part of 
an interconnected network of individuals who care for each other’. Therefore, if an 
aspect of the community is taken away, this might challenge the dehumanization of 
health care practices risking violation of the legal concept of human dignity.
4.3  Risk of Loneliness—Robots May Cause the Problem They Try to Solve
Robots may allow older adults and persons with disabilities to be in touch with rela-
tives, talk to doctors, or do grocery shopping. In other contexts, men and women 
rejected sexually by other men, or women might find comfort and company with 
a robotic sex doll. A sex doll will unlikely reject a person for his or her appear-
ance and might serve the desires of the person without opposition. A different ques-
tion may arise; nevertheless: could the continuous use of care or sexual companion 
robots intensify and reproduce the loneliness they try to bridge? Could therapeutic 
robots for children with autism isolate users and intensify even more their disorder 
(Howard et al. 2019; Fosch-Villaronga and Albo-Canals 2019)?
4.4  Risk of Ill‑Being, Dependency and Other Considerations
Recent research suggests that technology use might have harmful effects on children 
and adolescents in particular (Rosen et al. 2014; Carr 2010). In a study including 1030 
subjects (338 children, 316 pre-teen, and 376 teenagers), Rosen et al. (2014) concluded 
that not only unhealthy eating, lack of physical sport but also technology overuse pre-
dicts ill-being. In their study, Rosen et al. (2014) investigated whether certain types of 
technology including Internet, email, IMing/chatting, cellphone, video games, music 
players or technological toys had an impact on four different categories of ill-being, 
including physical problem symptomatology, psychological symptom manifestation, 
attention problems, and home and classroom behaviors. Children using technology 
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presented total ill-being, as well as attention and physical problems. In particular, 
children using music players and technological toys predicted more ill-being; and pre-
teenagers using email, cell phones, video games, and technological toys predicted more 
ill-being than those not using technology. For teenagers, it appeared that the overuse of 
any technology significantly predicted ill-being.
The conclusion of Rosen et al. (2014) was that technology use might have harmful 
effects on children and adolescents, and healthier food and more exercise might not be 
enough to improve their wellbeing. There is no reason to believe why robots might not 
have a similar impact on the wellbeing of users, including children, adolescents, older 
adults, and persons with disabilities (Fosch-Villaronga 2019). Similar to what happened 
to screens and phone usage, some may argue, however, that until robots become main-
stream, we might not be able to see the impact they have on us (Palmerini et al. 2014).
Roboticists individually program robots to create, support and maintain more 
extended engagement because it not only improves usability, more engagement leads 
to better results (Howard et  al. 2019). However, establishing and maintaining long-
term engagement (Leite et al. 2013), might create a dependency of robot technology. 
More longitudinal studies are much needed to help understand what the consequences 
and byproduct effects of the use and development of robot technology are (Fosch-
Villaronga and Albo-Canals 2019). As Fiske et al. highlight, ‘the impact of intelligent 
robots on relationships, both human–robot and human–human relationships, is an area 
that requires further probing, as do potential effects on identity, agency, and self-con-
sciousness in individual patients’ (Fiske et al. 2019).
4.5  Robot Technology Pressures Dignity
In the above subsections, we identified significant challenges concerning respecting 
human dignity while using robot technology for healthcare purposes. Such challenges 
mostly arise from the risk of disregarding autonomy, therefore creating situations where 
a person can be treated as an object. Also, by taking out the ‘human’ element from care, 
they risk dehumanizing these practices. Fosch-Villaronga and Poulsen (2019) provided 
a list of care-related considerations in the table cited below, that summarizes some of 
the most pressing legal and ethical implications of the use and development of robots 
for care purposes (Table 1).
All the considerations referred to in the table put pressure on the concept of legal dig-
nity, making it necessary for policymakers as well as developers to treat human–robot 
interactions with more care. Most importantly, further research in how each application 
corresponds with the inviolable belief in human dignity.
5  Regulating Human–Robot Interactions for Healthcare
Due to the novelty of practices and impacts seen in the above section, the devel-
opment of robot technology may bring about unclear rules and areas of legal 
ambiguity (Fosch-Villaronga and Heldeweg 2018). In this respect, across the 
globe, industry representatives, governments, academics, and civil society are 
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debating where legal-regulatory frameworks are needed and when, if ever, ethical 
or technical approaches suffice. The issue of the extent to which our existing ethi-
cal and regulatory frameworks cover sufficiently the impact of these technologies, 
however, still remains. In recent years, such opposing clash of worldviews has 
created a substantive body of academic work, discussing how to govern robotics 
or how to shape the course of technology-induced and ongoing social transfor-
mation. Academics and regulators are struggling to keep up with the number of 
articles, principles, regulatory measures, or technical standards produced on gov-
ernance of emerging technologies (Cath 2018).
In this section, we compile frameworks addressing different aspects of 
human–robot interactions aiming to protect users against the adverse impacts of 
using robot technology. In Europe, these impacts tend to be addressed through 
safety regulations, data protection legislation, and technology ethics. In par-
ticular, we focus on the extent to which they contribute towards the protection 
of ‘human dignity.’ First, we describe how safety rules protect dignity; second, 
how data protection rules try to regulate impacts on an individual’s privacy for 
safeguarding human dignity. Third, we look at how the Ethics Guidelines from 
the European High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence (appointed by 
the Commission in June 2018) (High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelli-
gence 2019) addresses the impacts on dignity arising from robot technology. In 
the last section, we provide an insightful, new perspective on how to regulate 
human–robot interactions from the lens of human dignity.
Table 1  Care-related issues for care robots
Care-related considerations Explanation
Human–robot safe interaction Robots may challenge the physical and mental integrity of the 
users. Both physical and cognitive safety should be protected
Allocation of responsibility Depending on the degree of control a user has, the question of who 
is responsible if something goes wrong may abound
Privacy and data protection loss Always-on robotic devices that monitor the activities of elders 
may challenge the protection of their data protection and privacy 
rights
Autonomy restriction Task delegations from the human to the machine risk overriding 
the autonomy and independence of a person
Deception and infantilization Mimicking life–life and human states may lead to questioning the 
authenticity of the relationship and deceive of the user. Robots 
may encourage the idea elders (with dementia) go through a 
second childhood
Objectification and loss of control Insensitive use of robots risks treating elders as if they were not 
sentient beings
Human–human interaction decrease Human–robot interaction may exacerbate existing elder loneliness 
and increase neglection by relatives and society
Long-term consequences Technology, including robots and AI, may have long-term conse-
quences that might be difficult to foresee before mass-adoption 
and continuous use
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5.1  Safety
Cicero already said many years ago that the safety of the people should be the 
highest law. Oxford dictionary (2019) defines safety as the “condition of being 
protected from or unlikely to cause danger, risk or injury.” Risk, on its side, is 
defined by “ISO 12100:2010 General Principles for Design-Risk Assessment and 
Risk Reduction” as the “combination of the probability of occurrence of harm 
and the severity of the harm.” As such, safety is considered one of the most press-
ing issues among human–robot interaction experts (Fosch-Villaronga et al. 2019). 
The most general framework for safety involving robots quoted by legal scholars 
is the three laws of robotics of Isaac Asimov’s (Leenes and Lucivero 2014):
1. A robot may not injure a human being or, through inaction, allow a human being 
to come to harm.
2. A robot must obey the orders given by human beings, except where such orders 
would conflict with the First Law.
3. A robot must protect its own existence as long as such protection does not conflict 
with the First or Second Laws.
Although initially three from Runaround in 1942, in 1986, a fourth law (that 
would be the zeroth law) was introduced by the same author in the Foundation of 
Earth:
0. A robot may not harm humanity, or, by inaction, allow humanity to come to 
harm.
Although part of science fiction, the European Parliament (2017) took this 
framework very seriously and suggested that they “must be regarded as being 
directed at the designers, producers, and operators of robots, including robots 
assigned with built-in autonomy and self-learning, since those laws cannot be 
converted into machine code”. Nevejans (2016) argued, however, that Asimov 
wrote these laws in a certain moment in time, pseudo-legally, explaining how 
humans would remain in control if robots would take over. The European Par-
liament seemed, however, to misinterpret the true meaning of the laws, which 
established more of a kind of machine ethics rather than directed to roboticists 
(Nevejans 2016), although like other aspects like privacy (Koops and Leenes 
2014) they may prove very difficult to be encoded.
A better point of departure could be the fundamental right to physical and psy-
chological integrity. However, the European Parliament (2017) makes no refer-
ences to it. Instead, the resolution states “the guiding ethical framework should be 
based on the principles of beneficence, non-maleficence, autonomy and justice, 
on the principles and values enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European 
Union and in the Charter of Fundamental Rights, such as human dignity, equality, 
justice and equity, non-discrimination, informed consent, private and family life 
and data protection.” In another part of the resolution, the Parliament stresses that 
“human dignity and autonomy—both physical and psychological—is always to be 
respected.”
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In this respect, “to guarantee a high level of product safety and consumer protec-
tion” the resolution redirects to safety standards, although it does not refer to already 
existing standards, such as ISO 13482:2014. Although this reference to private 
standards may revive the discussion on balance between legitimacy and effective-
ness of techno-regulations (Fosch-Villaronga and Heldeweg 2018; Fosch-Villaronga 
and Golia 2019), this is, for now, the only existing technical framework validated 
by all the members of the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), 
which include states and private bodies. The applicability of product liability laws 
and standards, however, might not be straightforward in the context of physically 
embodied robots comprising cyber-physical systems as ‘product interconnected with 
services, (…) an inseparable mixture of hardware, software, and service’ (Fosch-
Villaronga and Millard 2019). Indeed, the notions of product, producer, and defect 
are challenging to define and detect in complex products with physical and infor-
mational elements. In a sense, these laws and technical standards reflect a moment 
in time when products did not interconnect with other devices or their environment 
and when robots did not interact with humans (they mainly were caged in industrial 
environments with little human contact).
5.2  Data Protection Legislation for Regulating Human–Robot Interaction
Robots are systems that often operate thanks to the processing of vast amounts of 
personal data. A robot for the blind might process sensitive health data (the person’s 
health condition) about the owner, other categories of data (e.g., real-time location, 
eating habits, object position for obstacle-avoidance, metadata), and other persons 
(contact information, relevant caregivers). Moreover, a robot might use cloud ser-
vices that speed the processing of such an amount of information, enlarging this 
way the amount of stakeholders involved in the collection and processing of data 
(Fosch-Villaronga and Millard 2019). Protection from the adverse effects that such 
processing might have on individuals was one of the main objectives of the GDPR. 
However, robots are constructed systems that process much information, exert direct 
control over the physical world, and might cause harm in a way that humans can-
not necessarily correct or oversee well beyond a mere data protection infringement 
(Floridi 2016; Fosch-Villaronga and Millard 2019).
Floridi (2016) argues that the foundation for the right to data protection and the 
right to privacy GDPR aims to uphold is the concept of ‘human dignity.’ While not 
directly grounding itself in human dignity, the General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR 2016) stresses the idea to “include suitable and specific measures to safe-
guard the data subject’s human dignity.” The GDPR contains, however, two assump-
tions: (1) that the data subject is a human being, whose dignity needs to be safe-
guarded (a legal person could not enjoy human dignity); and (2) that human dignity 
is different from “legitimate interests and fundamental rights (Floridi 2016). In a 
similar line, the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) stated:
“Privacy is an integral part of human dignity, and the right to data protection 
was originally conceived in the 1970s and 80s as a way of compensating the 
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potential for the erosion of privacy and dignity through large scale personal 
data processing.”
Floridi is not the first scholar to suggest that privacy was grounded in the con-
cept of ‘human dignity.’ Legal scholars have widely discussed such a “dignitarian” 
approach to data protection (Lynskey 2015). However, some academics argue that 
although data protection provides sound principles, many socio-technical challenges 
presented by robot technologies, are not wholly dealt with in the concrete provisions 
of the GDPR (Cath 2018; Winfield and Jirotka 2018; Veale et al. 2018). While data 
protection legislation aims to protect personal data, the potential threats of robotics 
often go beyond that and include interference with the autonomy of individuals that 
does not depend on the collection of personal data. The use and development of 
robot technology question other aspects than mere data protection, such as physical 
and psychological integrity, responsibility, or autonomy (Fosch-Villaronga 2019).
Indeed, robots are not mere data-driven technologies. Robots have a physical 
embodiment that plays a significant role in several applications (Dautenhahn et al. 
2002; Jung and Lee 2004) and can sense, think, and act to perform tasks. Bearing in 
mind the shortcomings of GDPR, it would be probably wrong to consider data pro-
tection as the ultimate governance solution for human–robot interactions, as other 
aspects would fall outside of the protected scope of such regulations.
5.3  Technology Ethics
Failure of concrete provisional legislation to regulate all aspects of robotics has 
often been used to justify technological inevitability, inferring that law (in general 
rather than specific statues of legislation) is not able to keep up with technology 
(Holder et al. 2016; Guihot et al. 2017; Fosch-Villaronga et al. 2019). Such rheto-
ric of the pacing problem (Marchant et  al. 2011) is troubling, as it often fails to 
grasp the value of law and risks subordination of social structure to the worldview 
of a small group of profit-oriented individuals at the frontier of technology (Zuboff 
2019).
The modern Western world formed around the laws that confer human rights and 
acknowledge the sanctity of each life (Frank, 1999). These formal laws were agreed 
upon based on the shared aspired values and were expressed as new demands to 
make actual in everyday life (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2002). Therefore, along-
side the rapid development of robotics, articles, and policy documents addressing its 
governance proliferate in parallel. Some of these initiatives seem to suggest ‘ethics’ 
as the solution for ensuring the responsible use of robotics, as they understand that 
ethical values are underpinning the law that is often too rigid to change.
On its ‘principles for responsible stewardship of trustworthy AI,’ the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) noted that the appropriate-
ness of some of the legal and regulatory frameworks may need to be reassessed and 
new approaches developed respecting the rule of law, human rights and democratic 
values, such as human dignity (OECD 2019). While this recommendation tasks the 
Committee on Digital Economy Policy (CDEP) to monitor the implementation of 
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these standards across jurisdictions, it recognizes the need for further practical guid-
ance for operationalizing these standards.
The European institutions seem to gear the discussions revolving around the reg-
ulation of robotics and AI in a more actionable way. One of the most comprehensive 
and broadly discussed documents of technology ethics is the AI Ethics Guidelines 
(hereafter “HLEG guidelines”) published by the High-level expert group on Artifi-
cial Intelligence (High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence 2019) set up by 
the European Commission.
The guidelines ground directly into human dignity:
“The common foundation that unites these rights can be understood as 
rooted in respect for human dignity – thereby reflecting what we describe as 
a “human-centric approach” in which the human being enjoys a unique and 
inalienable moral status of primacy in the civil, political, economic and social 
fields.”
The HLEG guidelines suggest that ‘human dignity’ is an absolute value that can-
not be subject to any intervention and balancing exercise (like, for instance, data 
protection cases) and that it encompasses the intrinsic worth of every human, 
which no new technology or any other person should ever diminish, compromise 
or repress. Other bodies, such as private standards organizations like IEEE, also 
acknowledge the importance of designing autonomous and intelligent systems in a 
way that they ‘respect and fulfill human rights, freedoms, human dignity, and cul-
tural diversity’(IEEE 2018). Still, there are no enforceable standards in place stress-
ing the idea that dignity is the core value from which the subsequent to-be-respected 
rights emanate.
While the HLEG AI guidelines provide hints to what may be considered a vio-
lation of ‘human dignity’ in terms of human–robot interactions (violating human’s 
physical/mental integrity), it does not explicitly state which applications involve 
such violations. In this sense, some authors indicate that (soft) ethical solutions suf-
fer from conceptual ambiguity and lack of enforcement mechanisms, arguing that 
creating strong ethical principles is only the first step and that more should be done 
to assure implementation and accountability (Winfield and Jirotka 2018). Oth-
ers believe that it constitutes an ethics washing exercise (Wagner 2018; Metzinger 
2019), while others stress that this is better than not taking ethics into consideration 
all together (WEF 2019).
6  Dignity as an overarching concept for the governance of robotics
All these governance instruments, such as general technology ethics, human-
centric design, safety standards, or data protection rules, intended to guide the 
technological developments for organizing a rapidly transforming society for 
adhering to its values. However, as these individual instruments often tackle the 
limited scope of the values, currently, there is no overarching instrument provid-
ing the omnibus governance solution for using robots in healthcare and of (robot-
ics in general). For instance, safety standards for the use of robot-technology 
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in healthcare consider the physical and mental integrity of individuals about 
human–robot interactions, leaving out a morally salient aspect of the privacy of 
users. Also, while data protection rules provide enforceable rules for safeguard-
ing privacy during human–robot interactions, it scopes itself with the processing 
of personal data, leaving out the various issues such as long-term consequences 
of use of robotics in healthcare (e.g., loneliness).
As binding rules are limited and can not cover all the issues raised by 
human–robot interactions, there is a proliferation of articles and policy docu-
ments about the governance of robotics that seems to suggest ‘ethics’ as the solu-
tion for ensuring the responsible use of robots. Such issues are safety, allocation 
of responsibility, privacy, autonomy, objectification (also deception, and infan-
tilization), increased loneliness, dependency, or other long-term consequences. 
While ethics helps us understand ‘good’ and ‘bad’ applications of robot tech-
nology, it lacks enforceability. They are often ambiguous and are criticized for 
avoiding red lines, provide ‘ethics-washing,’ and transform fundamental rights 
into ‘potential rights’ (Wagner 2018). Therefore, even though ethical considera-
tions are valuable, ‘roboethics’ cannot be an omnibus governance solution for the 
use of healthcare in robotics, due to ambiguity and lack of enforceability.
Therefore, shortcomings of rules (e.g., safety, data protection) and roboeth-
ics, trigger the need for an overarching conceptual legal instrument that, at the 
same time, is flexible. This article argues that human dignity is the essence of 
what is being pressured by the use of robotics for healthcare. Human dignity is 
a general principle of law and inviolable value that all fundamental rights are 
grounded. At the same time, it combines various ethical considerations in one 
conceptual framework. While we have shown in Sect.  2 of this article that the 
concept of human dignity already has the content that may scope the use of robot-
ics in healthcare, we argue that in the absence of adequate formal rules might 
confound this concept ‘into a formless void of sentiment and intuition’ (Allsop 
2016). Therefore, this binding nature, on the one hand, and flexibility on the other 
suggests that human dignity can serve as a lens through which existing govern-
ance instruments are re-evaluated, combined, and new regulation formulated that 
is overarching governance solution based on human dignity.
In the human rights context, human dignity (that in this article is seen as 
the foundational belief that all human rights are grounded, rather than separate 
human right) can be read as a negative obligation restricting states from violat-
ing the dignity of their citizens. However, the need to apply human rights hori-
zontally has been apparent as private entities are increasingly accumulating 
knowledge and power (Kanalan 2016). In cases where private actors fail to take 
responsibility to act per human rights, the framework ascribes a positive obliga-
tion to states to safeguard human dignity in horizontal relationships. Therefore, 
this article provides policy advice for the states in the first place, to provide gov-
ernance of robotics through the lens of human dignity. This will require further, 
more comprehensive exploration of what such a flexible concept of human dig-
nity entails in contemporary (and ever-evolving) society, and how can robotics 
challenge this notion.
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7  Conclusion
In this article, we reviewed some applications of robot technology in the health-
care domain from the lens of human dignity. We identified how these applica-
tions might promote or pressure human dignity. In general, the integration of 
robot technologies in healthcare provides a practical, complementary solution to 
address the increasing demand for care services. Robot technology could coun-
terbalance the problems arising from the shortage of healthcare professionals and 
could be a good way to promote safer, more efficient, and personalized care. If 
done correctly, new healthcare applications of robot technology can support indi-
viduals in gaining back the ‘dignity’ that their condition took away and that cur-
rent healthcare services never provided.
On the other hand, technology has broader, not always foreseeable conse-
quences, and robot technology may also have an effect on human nature that we 
currently cannot anticipate. Moreover, recent findings suggest that some applica-
tions risk not treating humans as moral subjects, but mere objects that can be 
conditioned or manipulated. If these risks are not addressed, and the applications 
are not reconsidered, the violation of human dignity seems inevitable. Recent lit-
erature also highlights that technology might have unintended long-term harmful 
impacts on the human psyche, in particular on the way the brain works and the 
person’s identity and self-respect, and this also questions whether these technolo-
gies are adequate for care purposes.
Lastly, we addressed the individual approaches to regulating the use of robots 
in healthcare and highlighted their shortcomings in providing overarching gov-
ernance solutions for robotics. We argued that while the scope of data protection 
and safety rules are too limited, the ethics approach lacks enforceability and clar-
ity. We stress the need for absolute protection of human dignity in the context of 
robot technology, especially if deployed in healthcare settings. Human dignity is 
the ultimate, overarching legal concept upon which all the rights are based and 
should be the basis of future legal intervention aimed at addressing the govern-
ance of robot technology, especially for healthcare. Therefore, we conclude by 
giving the policy advice to formulate an overarching, omnibus governance solu-
tion for robotics that will be based on the concept of human dignity. With this in 
mind, we acknowledge that furthermore, detailed research is necessary to clar-
ify what dignity means in this connected, ever-evolving, and at the same time, 
diverse contemporary society and how the uses of robotics may challenge this 
notion.
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